In this paper, we empirically assess how economic sanctions imposed by the UN and the US affect the target states' GDP growth. Our sample includes 68 countries and covers the period 1976-2012. We find, first, that sanctions imposed by the UN have a statistically and economically significant influence on economic growth. On average, the imposition of UN sanctions decreases the target state's real per capita GDP growth rate by 2.3-3.5 percentage points (pp). These adverse effects last for a period of 10 years. Comprehensive UN economic sanctions, that is, embargoes affecting nearly all economic activity, trigger a reduction in GDP growth by more than 5 pp. Second, the effect of US sanctions is much smaller and less distinct. The imposition of US sanctions decreases GDP growth in the target state over a period of 7 years and, on average, by 0.5-0.9 pp.
Introduction
Economic sanctions have become one of the most important tools of statecraft in international politics (Cortright and Lopez, 2000) . Designed as a means of compelling governments to comply with the imposing state's interests, these measures aim at changing the target nation's policies by inflicting economic damage. They are viewed as a nonviolent, more humane alternative to military intervention. However, the imposition of economic sanctions is often met with harsh criticism, which is based in the unpleasant reality that even though these measures are directed against governments, more often than not, it is the target state's public that bears the costs. This result can be particularly unfair when the regime against which sanctions are directed lacks democratic legitimation.
There is a huge and vibrant literature on the adverse effects of economic sanctions on the target states' humanitarian situation. Sanctions are argued to have devastating consequences for the civilian population as they can negatively affect the availability of food and clean water (Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Weiss et al., 1997) and access to medicine and health-care services (e.g., Garfield, 2002; Gibbons and Garfield, 1999) , as well as have a detrimental impact on life expectancy and infant mortality (e.g., Ali Mohamed and Shah, 2000; Daponte and Garfield, 2000) . Most of this research is qualitative, however, and based on single-country case studies. Quantitative assessments of sanction effects typically focus on their impact on various measures of the human rights situation (e.g., Peksen, 2009; Wood, 2008) , political stability within the target state (Allen, 2008; Marinov, 2005) , level of democracy (Peksen and Drury, 2010) , and their success in terms of meeting the desired objectives (e.g., Hufbauer et al., 2009; Drury, 1998; Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997) . 1 The findings are dispiriting. For example, Peksen (2009) reports that economic sanctions worsen the targeted government's respect for human rights; Peksen and Drury (2010) find that economic sanctions have a detrimental impact on the level of democracy. Moreover, economic sanctions fail to achieve their aims in 65-95% of the cases in which they are imposed (e.g., Hufbauer et al., 2009; Pape, 1997 Pape, , 1998 .
Empirical research on the economic consequences of economic sanctions is scarce. Evenett (2002) estimates the impact of eight industrialized countries' sanctions against 1 There are also theoretical public choice and game-theoretical analyses on conditions under which economic sanctions may trigger policy changes. Examples are Kaempfer et al. (2004) , Lowenberg (1988, 1999) , and Eaton and Engers (1992) .
the South African Apartheid regime on these countries' bilateral trade relations with South Africa between 1978 and 1999. His findings suggest that the US Anti-Apartheid Act had the strongest influence on South African exports. Hufbauer et al. (2009) rely on a large sample of bi-and multilateral economic sanction episodes and estimate gravity models. They find that the imposition of economic sanctions significantly reduces the volume of bilateral trade between the imposing and the target state. This paper is the first econometric assessment of the impact economic sanctions have on the target's overall economic development. 2 More precisely, we analyze the effect economic sanctions have on the target countries' GDP growth rate, thereby focusing on (i) multilateral sanctions imposed by the United Nations as well as (ii) unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States. The UN Security Council (UNSC) can call on its member states to partially or completely interrupt economic relations with a state that threatens or breaches international peace and security. First employed in 1965 against Rhodesia, the use of this measure has become increasingly popular during the past two decades (see also Figure 1a in Section 3.2). All UN member states are obliged to adopt the sanction measures determined by the UNSC, which is why these are expected to be particularly effective. With regard to the US, no other country in the world has imposed economic sanctions more often (Hufbauer, 1998; Hufbauer et al., 2009) . Although unilateral, the importance of the United States to the global economy may make them an influential policy instrument.
We compiled a unique dataset comprised of UN and US sanction episodes between 1976 and 2012. Our results suggest, first, that sanctions imposed by the UN have a significant influence on economic growth. On average, the imposition of UN sanctions decreases the target state's real per capita GDP growth rate by 2.3-3.5 percentage points (pp). An investigation of the dynamics of the sanction effects reveals that the detrimental influence decreases over time and becomes insignificant after 10 years.
Differentiating between categories of economic sanctions, we find that comprehensive UN economic sanctions-that is, embargoes on nearly all economic activity between UN 2 Hufbauer et al. (2009: 211ff) provide rough approximations of the effect of economic sanctions on the target countries' gross national product. However, the authors themselves admit that their assessment is rather rudimentary. They simply consider the initial reduction in net exports and foreign grants associated with the imposition of economic sanctions, weigh this figure with a "sanction multiplier," which is based on the authors' subjective judgment of the substitution elasticities of domestic demand and international supply of the embargoed goods, and put this measure in relation to the target state's gross national product. However, economic sanctions may affect the target country's GNP in several ways, as outlined in more detail in Section 2 of this paper. member states and the sanctioned country-exert the strongest influence; they trigger a reduction in real GDP growth of more than 5 pp. Our findings are robust to modifications of the empirical specification that control for potential changes in a country's institutional, political, and social environment. Moreover, when comparing the effect of UN economic sanctions which were actually imposed to those which were blocked by a veto in the UNSC we find that only the former ones exert an adverse impact on economic growth, indicating that our results are not driven by omitted factors that coincide with sanction periods. Second, the adverse effect of US sanctions on real GDP growth is much smaller and less lasting than that of UN sanctions. The imposition of US sanctions decreases GDP growth in the target state over a period of 7 years and, on average, by 0.5-0.9 pp.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some theoretical arguments for why sanctions may have adverse growth effects in the target countries and outlines the research hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the empirical methodology and the dataset. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 explores the robustness of our findings with respect to changes in the control sample. Section 6 examines the impact of sanctions on GDP growth over time. Section 7 concludes.
Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses
Economic sanctions are intended to be coercive measures that fall between mere diplomatic pressure and the extreme action of military intervention. According to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, sanctions "represent more than just verbal condemnation and less than the use of armed force." 3 Or, as the former US President Woodrow Wilson put it: "A nation boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender.
Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force" (quoted in Heine-Ellison, 2001: 83) . Theoretically, economic sanctions are powerful due to their potential to inflict economic damage. Thus, one should expect UN and US economic sanction episodes to have a detrimental impact on the target nation's economic development. Yet, there is hardly any empirical assessment of the economic costs incurred by sanctions.
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There are several channels through which sanctions may adversely affect the economic performance of the target state. The most obvious of these include a slump in exports and imports, the related loss of bargaining power on international markets, and the contraction of international capital flows, that is, withdrawal of foreign direct investment, foreign aid, and financial grants (Hufbauer et al., 2009; Evenett, 2002) .
However, such adverse effects may occur even when trade embargoes or suspensions of international aid and capital flows are not explicitly imposed. Economic sanctions are often used as a symbolic instrument to stigmatize political regimes (Whang, 2011) . The associated loss of reputation may very well isolate the target state within the international community and deter donors from further providing aid and investments.
Economic sanctions aim at triggering political reforms or even overthrowing the target's political regime. Moreover, economic agents may view sanctions as a sort of early-warning signal that political or societal conflicts in the target state have the potential to escalate. Sanctions thus represent or indicate a serious threat to the target state's political stability and can invoke a great deal of uncertainty about the future of the political and legal system. This ought to have a harmful impact on the target state's trade and financial relations as well as on its domestic and foreign direct investment.
Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that sanction episodes are associated with political turmoil and transition (Peksen and Drury, 2010; Allen, 2008; Marinov, 2005) . Political instability, in turn, is found to have detrimental effects on investment and savings as well as on economic growth Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Aizenman and Marion, 1993) . In a similar vein, sanctions may affect the target's access to international credit markets as investors might be concerned about the sanctioned state's solvency or the payment practices of a successor regime.
Finally, the imposition of economic sanctions often results in an expansion of the shadow economy as economic agents try to evade sanction measures, involving a marginalization of licit commerce as well as public acceptance of illegal economic activity (e.g., Andreas, 2005; Heine-Ellison, 2001; Crawford and Klotz, 1999) . Moreover, governments against which sanctions are directed often fail to foster compliance with laws as economic sanctions undermine their authority and legitimacy. What is more, target governments may even promote illegal economic activities in order to generate funds, secure supplies, and strengthen their power. Also, the decline in government authority as well as the rise of political instability frequently involve an increase in corruption. As a consequence, transaction costs increase and more resources tend to be used unproductively.
The strength of the effect economic sanctions have on the target state's economy may be related to various factors. For example, it could be that the impact of economic sanctions depends on their severity. Previous sanctions employed by the UN and the US range from freezing private and public funds and assets to banning grants and credits to imposing embargoes on certain or all economic activities (for an overview, see Table 1 in Section 3.2). Multilateral UN sanctions ought to have a stronger adverse effect on the target country's GDP growth than unilateral US sanctions simply because of the larger number of countries involved in the imposition of the former. Accordingly, we formulate three hypotheses that we put to an empirical test in this paper.
H1: UN and US economic sanctions have a negative effect on the target country's real GDP per capita growth.
H2: The negative effect increases with increasing severity of the sanctions.
H3: The negative effect is stronger for UN sanctions than for US sanctions.
Empirical Methodology and Data

Empirical Methodology
To assess the impact of UN and US economic sanctions on the sanctioned state's economic performance, we estimate different versions of the following model: highest degree of violation). Second, we control for the degree of democracy or autocracy in a country using a policy variable that is scaled from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Third, we take into account (i) interstate armed conflicts, (ii) internal armed conflicts without intervention from other states, and (iii) internationalized internal armed conflicts with intervention from other states. For all three types of conflict we include separate dummy variables for minor conflicts and wars, respectively.
Finally, we consider control variables that are standard in economic growth equations:
the log of real per capita GDP in 2005 US dollars, 6 trade openness (imports plus exports divided by GDP), and the log of population. We employ the first lag of these variables to circumvent problems of reverse causality. A list of the control variables along with their definitions and sources can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. 9
Data on UN and US Sanctions
We compiled a unique dataset comprised of all UN and US sanction episodes that occurred between 1976 and 2012. UN sanctions were collected from the UN website and cross-checked with Wood's (2008) dataset, which, unfortunately, ends in 2001. For US sanctions, we relied on Hufbauer et al.'s (2009) dataset and augmented it with information from the US Congress websites. Each sanction was categorized as either "mild," "moderate," or "severe," based on the definitions found in Wood (2008) (see Table 1 ). The overall number of country/year observations in which UN sanctions are in place (200; 9.3% of the observations) is much lower than that for US sanctions (618; 28.6%).
Similarly, UN sanctions have been imposed against only 23 countries, whereas a total of 64 countries have at least one non-zero observation for US sanctions. In addition, the US sanctions are on average harsher than those of the UN as 21.8% of US sanctions fall into category 3 (compared to 12% for the UN). These findings are not surprising, of course, since UN sanctions have to be enacted by the UNSC, which consists of five veto powers, whereas US sanctions only have to pass the US legislative. Also interesting is the huge increase in the frequency of UN sanctions after the end of the Cold War. The frequency of 10 sanctions is highest during the 1990s due to the First Gulf War, the Yugoslav Wars, and several civil wars in Africa. 
Empirical Results
Binary Sanction Variable
First, we put H1 to the test. The results are shown in Table 2 . We estimate three different specifications of Equation (1) 35   1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 mild moderate severe (Column (1) of Table 2) ; one with a dummy for US sanctions only (Column (2)); and one with separate dummies for both UN and US sanctions (Column (3)). 7 
Different Levels of Sanctions
The results for the test of H2 are shown in Table 3 . We estimate three versions of our empirical model: the first includes three indicator variables for UN sanctions only (Column (4)); the second includes the same set of variables for US sanctions only (Column (5)); and the third includes a total of six sanction indicators for both the UN and US (Column (6)). We have at least some evidence in support of H3. The adverse effect of economic sanctions on the target country's real GDP growth is stronger for moderate and severe UN sanctions than for US sanctions of the same type. Statistical testing rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level (moderate sanctions: F(1,2039) = 6.19**; severe sanctions:
F(1,2039) = 5.67**). In case of mild sanctions, however, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (F(1,2039) = 0.11).
To put our findings into perspective, we compare the adverse effects of sanctions with the negative consequences some of the control variables in Column (6) of Table 3 
Robustness Tests
Narrowing the Control Window
Thus far, our estimates are-roughly speaking-based on a comparison of conditional means of growth in periods during which sanctions are in places compared to times when they are not. It could be argued, however, that the institutional, political, and social environment is not comparable during these periods. Furthermore, the imposition of sanctions might be a consequence of an environment that is considered bad by the UN and/or the US. To address this potential endogeneity problem we reduce the control In total, we explore the robustness of our findings with four modifications to the sample period. In addition to the sanction period, we consider (i) a window of five years around, (ii) a window of three years around, (iii) the five years before, and (iv) the three years before. Table A3 in the Appendix presents the results for the binary sanction variables and Table A4 for the version in which we take account of the severity of the sanctions.
In general, the results for UN sanctions in the restricted samples are similar to those for the full sample in terms of size and significance. In the case of the binary sanction indicator, the adverse effect is even slightly larger, ranging from -2.65 pp to -3.54 pp (Table A3 ) compared to -2.30 pp ( Table 2 ). The coefficients for mild sanctions are also larger in absolute terms throughout all modifications compared to the unrestricted sample. In the case of moderate and severe sanctions, the estimates for the unrestricted 15 sample are in between those of the truncated samples. The maximum adverse effect is found for severe sanctions when only considering the three years before the sanction period (-7.80 pp).
The results for US sanctions, however, are not robust to modifications in the sample period. The binary sanction indicator is insignificant, irrespective of which sample restriction is imposed. When including different variables for the degree of severity, the finding for mild sanctions is replicated only when the sample is restricted to five (three) years before the sanction period.
Therefore, multilateral UN sanctions have a (much) stronger adverse effect on the target country's GDP growth compared to unilateral US sanctions. As mentioned, the reason for this could be as simple as that there is a larger number of countries involved in the imposition of UN sanctions. To summarize, the imposition of UN sanctions decreases the target state's annual real per capita GDP growth rate by 2.3-3.5 pp and the imposition of comprehensive UN economic sanctions triggers a reduction in real GDP growth of more than 5 pp.
One explanation for the non-robust results for US sanctions might be that their impact is more heterogeneous across target countries than that of UN sanctions. As discussed above, countries might circumvent US sanctions by increasing their trade with other countries or they may not even have had a relevant trade relationship with the US in the first place. Therefore, as part of our robustness tests, we extend Equation (1) Another explanation might be that the impact of US sanctions is less lasting than that of UN sanctions. That is, the effect of US sanctions on the target country's GDP is too shortlived to be significant in our empirical setup as we compare average conditional GDP growth rates across the sanction period and the non-sanction period. We will return to this issue in Section 6 where we explore the impact of sanctions over time. 9 Results are available on request. 16
Counterfactual Analysis for UN Sanctions
Next, we apply a control group approach and compare the growth effect of UN economic sanctions which were actually imposed and sanctions which did not become effective. In this regard, we take advantage of a peculiarity of the UN decision-making process: before the UN may call upon its member states to impose economic sanctions, the UNSC has to adopt a resolution in which its members declare that the designated target state either threatens international peace and security or violates human rights.
The adoption of such a resolution and, thus, the imposition of economic sanctions can be prevented by any of the five permanent members of the UNSC-i.e., China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-since they are endowed with a veto right. Fortunately, the drafts of all vetoed resolutions are accessible at the UN website.
We focus on countries against which resolutions were directed but failed due to the veto of either one or two permanent members of the UNSC. 10 Arguably, the pre-sanction political and social environment in countries which were actually exposed to UN sanctions should be comparable to that in countries which were almost sanctioned (at least on average), in particular, since a majority of UNSC members supported the imposition of sanction measures against countries within the latter group. Thus, countries against which failed resolutions were directed can be considered as counterfactuals and utilized to examine whether the adverse growth effect of UN sanctions is driven by omitted factors that coincide with sanction periods.
For this purpose, we extend our sample and include-in addition to the countries which were actually exposed to UN sanctions-also countries which were almost (i.e., the adoption of a corresponding resolution failed due to a veto in the UNSC) subject to UN sanctions. We then compare the GDP growth effects of realized sanctions and unsuccessful resolutions. To do so, we consecutively add three indicator variables for failed resolutions to our baseline empirical model. Our binary indicator variables take on the value 1 (i) in the veto year, (ii) in the veto year plus the two following years, (iii) in the veto year plus the four following years. If UN economic sanctions have a causal influence on economic growth then the effect of the sanctions should be more pronounced than that of failed resolutions. Table A5 in the Appendix presents the results for the binary sanction variable and   Table A6 for the version in which we take account of the severity of the sanctions. The findings suggest that failed resolutions do not affect the designated target country's GDP growth. In each of the six specifications, the indicator variable for vetoed resolutions is not statistically different from zero. What is more, the adverse effect of economic sanctions-regardless of their severity-is notably larger than that of vetoed resolutions. Thus, our previous results are unlikely affected by omitted factors that coincide with sanction periods.
Impact of Sanctions over Time
So far, we implicitly assumed that the effects of UN and US economic sanctions are time-invariant. However, there is some reason to believe that the detrimental impact economic sanctions exert on GDP growth is decreasing over time. First, the length of a sanction period may indicate the strength of the incumbent political regime. Arguably, the longer the target state's government can withstand the economic and political pressure associated with economic sanctions, the lower are the expectations that the sanction measures actually trigger desired changes in the political and social environment. This may restore investors' confidence in the stability of the target state's political and legal system. Second, after some time has passed, the target government as well as the economic agents within the target country may adapt to the new situation and learn how to successfully evade sanction measures, reducing the economic costs they incur. Finally, sanctions which are particularly harmful may also be particularly effective and will thus be lifted sooner.
To examine the development of the sanction effects over time, we extend Equation (1) by interacting the sanction indicators with a variable that measures the years elapsed since the respective sanction has been imposed. 11 The results are shown in Table 4 .
Column (7) provides the estimates for the binary sanction variables, whereas Column (8) offers insight into the dynamics when distinguishing between different sanction categories. -0.08 *** -0.08 *** openness t-1 0.02 *** 0.02 *** log(population) t-1 -0.06 *** -0.06 *** political terror t -0.55 ** -0.65 *** polity score t -0.12 *** -0.13 *** interstate conflict t minor -2.24 ** -2.32 ** war -6.76 *** -6.57 *** internal conflict w/o intervention t minor -0.30 -0.09 war -3.68 *** -3.47 *** internal conflict w/ intervention t minor -1.37 -1.33 war -6.67 *** -6.57 *** UN sanctions (yes/no) t Our findings for the binary sanction indicators suggest that the effects of UN and US economic sanctions vary considerably over time as both the linear and the interaction 19 terms are of notable size and statistically significant. The initial negative influence of UN sanctions on GDP growth is -4.88 pp, which is notably larger (in absolute terms) than the corresponding estimate in our baseline specification (-2.30 pp; see Column (3) of (3) of Table 2 ).
To facilitate interpretation of the interaction terms and to glean further insights into the development of the sanction effects over time we graphically illustrate timedependent marginal effects along with 90% confidence bands for the binary UN and US sanction indicators. Estimates are based on the results from Column (7) in Table 4 . The dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals.
As Figure 2 shows, UN sanctions exert a significant negative influence on the target country's GDP growth for 10 years, whereas the adverse effect of US sanctions lasts for 7
years. In addition, the detrimental impact of UN sanctions is significantly larger (in absolute terms) than that of US sanctions throughout the first eight years. 12 Thus, the economic costs UN sanctions inflict on the target state are notably larger than those of US sanctions as UN sanctions exert a stronger negative influence on GDP growth and are also longer lasting.
We obtain similar results when distinguishing between different levels of sanctions (Column (8) of Table 4 ). Initially, mild (-3.50 pp), moderate (-4.57 pp), and severe (-13.10 pp) UN sanctions have a huge negative influence on the target country's GDP growth. These adverse effects are mitigated over time by 0.25 pp (mild), 0.11 pp (moderate), and 1.64 pp (severe) with every year that passes after the imposition of the respective sanction measures. Turning to US sanctions, the picture from our baseline specification changes a bit: in addition to mild sanctions (-2.19 pp), also moderate sanctions (-2.73 pp) initially exert a significant negative influence on GDP growth; the effect of the latter sanction category was insignificant when computing an average effect over the whole sanction period (see Column (6) in Table 3 ). For both, mild and moderate US sanctions, we observe a significant decrease of the detrimental effect over time (mild: 0.19 pp; moderate 0.34 pp). The impact of severe sanctions, however, remains insignificant. Figure A1 in the Appendix graphically illustrates the corresponding time-dependent marginal effects for different levels of sanctions. The results are qualitatively the same as for the binary sanction indicators. The influence of UN sanctions is longer lasting than that of US sanctions. Mild, moderate, and severe UN sanctions exert a statistically significant influence on GDP growth for 7, 14, and 6 years, respectively, whereas mild, moderate, and severe US sanctions have a detrimental effect for 6, 4, and 0 years, respectively.
Finally, as in Section 5.1, we explore the robustness of our findings with four modifications to the sample period. In addition to the sanction period, we consider (i) a window of five years around, (ii) a window of three years around, (iii) the five years before, and (iv) the three years before. Table A7 in the Appendix presents the results for the binary sanction variables and Table A8 for the specifications in which we take account of the severity of the sanctions.
The most important finding from these robustness tests is that, in contrast to the specifications without an interaction term (see Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix), the 21 results for the US binary sanction indicator as well as for mild US sanctions are robust with respect to modifications to the control sample. The results for moderate US sanctions, however, become insignificant in both specifications in which the control window ends after the sanction period (Columns (A21) and (A22) in Table A8 ). Turning to UN sanctions, the results remain qualitatively unchanged. 13 To summarize, the robustness tests confirm that it is crucial to account for time-variation when estimating the effects of US sanctions on the target country's GDP growth.
Conclusions
In this paper, we empirically assess how (i) multilateral economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations and (ii) unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States affect the target states' real GDP growth. We augment a standard growth model by indicator variables for UN and US sanctions, also taking into account that the reasons economic sanctions are imposed-that is, engagement in interstate conflicts, autocratic tendencies, and political repression-might in themselves affect a country's economic development. Our sample includes 68 countries and covers the period from 1976 to 2012.
Our results suggest, first, that sanctions imposed by the UN have a significant influence on economic growth. On average, the imposition of UN sanctions decreases the target state's real per capita GDP growth rate by 2.3-3.5 pp. An investigation of the dynamics of the sanction effects reveals that the detrimental influence decreases over time and becomes insignificant after 10 years. We find that comprehensive UN economic sanctions-embargoes on almost all economic activity between UN member states and the sanctioned country-have the strongest influence; they trigger a reduction in real GDP growth by more than 5 pp. Our findings are robust to modifications of our empirical specification that control for potential changes in a country's institutional, political, and social environment. Moreover, we compare annual real GDP growth rates during actual UN sanction periods and the years after an unsuccessful attempt by the UN Security Council to impose sanctions (i.e., when the imposition of sanctions was prevented by a veto of a permanent member of the UNSC). Our findings suggest that real GDP growth declines only when economic sanctions are actually imposed, indicating that our results are not driven by omitted factors that coincide with UN sanction episodes. Second, the effect of US sanctions is much smaller and robust only when allowing for time-variation in the effect of sanctions on growth. The imposition of US sanctions decreases GDP growth in the target state over a period of 7 years and, on average, by 0.5-0.9 pp.
Our results suggest that multilateral UN sanctions are indeed harmful to the target country's economy and have a (much) stronger adverse effect than unilateral US sanctions. Whether these sanctions are an appropriate (irrespective of their effectiveness) tool for compelling governments to comply with the UN's interests remains unclear, especially in light of the frequent criticism that they often cause more damage to the poor than to the political elite. An interesting and useful extension of this work would be to discover the consequences of economic sanctions for poverty in the target country. 14 and wars (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year). UN sanctions. As defined in Table 1 .
Source: Own collection and Wood (2008) . Table 1 .
US sanctions. As defined in
Source: Hufbauer et al. (2009 ), Wood (2008 , and own collection.
27 Table A3 : The impact of sanctions on GDP growth: robustness test for different time windows and the binary sanction variable (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) log(real GDP/capita) t-1 -0.11 ** -0.13 ** -0.12 *** -0.13 *** openness t-1 0.02 ** 0.02 ** 0.02 * 0.02 * log(population) t-1 -0.06 * -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 political terror t -1.04 ** -1.30 ** -1.38 *** -1.81 *** polity score t -0.12 * -0.13 * -0.11 -0.15 * interstate conflict t minor -1. -0.11 *** -0.11 *** -0.11 *** openness t-1 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.03 ** log(population) t-1 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 political terror t -1.29 *** -1.33 *** -1.34 *** polity score t -0.28 *** -0.28 *** -0.29 *** interstate conflict t minor -8.69 *** -9.09 *** -9.25 *** -0.11 *** -0.11 *** -0.11 *** openness t-1 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.03 ** log(population) t-1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 political terror t -1.29 *** -1.33 *** -1.35 *** polity score t -0.32 *** -0.33 *** -0.33 *** interstate conflict t minor -8.69 *** -9.11 *** -9.27 *** war -8.95 *** -9.10 *** -9.10 *** internal conflict w/o intervention t minor 0.46 0.43 0.43 war -5.60 *** -5.65 *** -5.59 *** internal conflict w/ intervention t minor -3.93 * -3.91 * -3.89 * war -5.42 *** -5.37 *** -5.30 *** UN resolution vetoed (yes/no) t -0.28 1.54 1.81 UN sanctions t mild -1.83 -1.77 -1.73 moderate -3.98 *** -3.97 *** -3.95 *** severe -6.20 ** -6.18 ** -6.19 ** time window Table A7 : The impact of sanctions on GDP growth over time: robustness test for different time windows and the binary sanction variable (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18) log(real GDP/capita) t-1 -0.11 *** -0.13 *** -0.12 *** -0.14 *** openness t-1 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.02 * 0.03 ** log(population) t-1 -0.06 ** -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 political terror t -0.91 *** -1.19 *** -1.24 *** -1.70 *** polity score t -0.12 ** -0.14 ** -0.10 -0.13 interstate conflict t minor -1.80 -1.53 -1.88 -1.23 war -6.48 *** -6.22 *** -6.46 *** -6.53 *** internal conflict w/o intervention t minor -0.72 -1.29 -1.02 -0.94 war -5.17 *** -5.95 *** -6.54 *** -6.20 *** internal conflict w/ intervention t minor -0.80 -2.87 -2.58 -2.89 war -6.45 *** -6.57 *** -7.14 *** -6.89 *** UN sanctions (yes/no) t Notes: Dependent variable is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita in 2005 US dollars. In addition to the actual sanction period, Columns (A15) and (A16) include a window of only five and three years around this period, respectively. Columns (A17) and (A18) restrict the sample to five and three years before the sanction period (which is also included), respectively. Model includes country-fixed effects and time-fixed effects. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
33 Table A8 : The impact of sanctions on GDP growth over time: robustness test for different time windows and different sanction levels (A19) (A20) (A21) (A22) log(real GDP/capita) t-1 -0.11 *** -0.14 *** -0.12 *** -0.15 *** openness t-1 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.02 0.02 log(population) t-1 -0.05 * -0.02 -0.01 0.01 political terror t -1.05 *** -1.30 *** -1.47 *** -1.96 *** polity score t -0.14 ** -0.15 ** -0.12 -0.16 * interstate conflict t minor -1.83 -1.44 -1.86 -1.17 war -6.15 *** -6.00 *** -6.46 *** -6.63 *** internal conflict w/o intervention t minor -0.39 -0.99 -0.57 -0.46 war -4.85 *** -5.76 *** -6.09 *** -5.86 *** internal conflict w/ intervention t minor -0.67 -2.91 -2.43 -2.86 war -6.22 *** -6.48 *** -6.79 *** -6.49 *** UN sanctions t mild -3.51 ** -3.83 ** -3.67 ** -4.34 ** mild * years 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.07 moderate -3.98 * -3.85 * -3.72 * -3.76 * moderate * years -0.08 -0.15 0.04 0.01 severe -12.52 *** -13.52 *** -14.53 *** -15.77 *** severe * years 1.51 *** 1.43 ** 1.55 *** 1.57 *** US sanctions t mild -1.71 * -1.85 * -2.65 *** -3.09 *** mild * years 0.17 0.19 0.32 ** 0.42 ** moderate -2.64 * -2.88 * -1.62 -1.18 moderate * years 0.37 *** 0.43 *** 0.41 *** 0.45 *** severe 0. 
